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Socialization, Language, and Scenic Understanding. 
Alfred Lorenzer's Contribution to a  
Psycho-Societal Methodology  
Henning Salling Olesen & Kirsten Weber ∗ 
Abstract: »Sozialisation, Sprache und szenisches Verstehen. Alfred Lorenzers Bei-
trag zu einer psychosozialen Methodologie«. The article is a guided tour to Alfred 
Lorenzer's proposal for an "in-depth hermeneutic" cultural analysis methodology 
which was launched in an environment with an almost complete split between 
social sciences and psychology/psychoanalysis. It presents the background in his 
materialist socialization theory, which combines a social reinterpretation of the 
core insights in classical psychoanalysis – the unconscious, the drives – with a 
theory of language acquisition. His methodology is based on a transformation of 
the "scenic understanding" from a clinical to a text interpretation, which seeks to 
understand collective unconscious meaning in text, and is presented with an illus-
tration of the interpretation procedure from social research. Then follows a brief 
systematic account of key concepts and ideas – interaction forms, engrams, expe-
rience, symbolization, language game, utopian imagination – with an outlook to 
the social theory connections to the Frankfurt School. The practical interpretation 
procedure in a Lorenzer-based psycho-societal research is briefly summarized, 
emphasizing the role of the researcher subjects in discovering socially uncon-
scious meaning in social interaction. Finally an outlook to contemporary episte-
mological issues is given. Lorenzer's approach to theorize and research the subject 
as a socially produced entity appears as a psycho-societal alternative to main-
stream social constructivism. 
Keywords: hermeneutic, scenic understanding, socialization, interaction forms, 
unconscious, experience, symbolization, language game, utopian imagination, 
constructivism. 
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1.  The Landscape before and around Lorenzer 
In their important and influential book "The Social Construction of Reality" 
(1966) Berger and Luckmann seek to create a holistic social theory, which 
recognizes the social significance of human agency and consciousness by syn-
thesizing the macro-societal perspective of knowledge sociology with G.H. 
Mead’s micro-perspective of meaningful agency and social psychology. In an 
interesting note they quite strongly ban recent attempts to synthesize Marxism 
and psychoanalysis:  
There is a considerable irony in the fact that, of late, neo-Marxist theoreticians 
have been seeking a liaison with Freudian psychology (which is fundamental-
ly incompatible with the anthropological presuppositions of Marxism), com-
pletely oblivious of the existence of a Meadian theory of the dialectic between 
society and the individual that would be immeasurably more congenial to their 
own approach. For a recent example of this ironic phenomenon, cf. Georges 
Lapassade, L‘entrée dans la Vie (Paris, Eds. de Minuit 1963) (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966, 218, Note 25).  
Symbolic interactionism, inspired from phenomenology, and action sociology 
primarily sees society as conscious and meaningful agency in the life world and 
Berger and Luckmann argue that knowledge sociology provides the under-
standing of how agency makes up the foundation for societal structure through 
a process of sedimentation and/or reification. Obviously they see Mead’s social 
psychology as the concept best theorizing the subjectivity of agency. Their 
account of socialization is almost exclusively about the societal imprint on the 
individual agent – c.f. the reference to Mead. The role of subjectivity in history 
(and Berger and Luckmann’s theory is actually also a historical account of the 
emergence of society) remains largely untheorized in its own right, and they 
explicitly and very quickly abstain from elaborating “a genuinely dialectic 
social psychology” which they admit would be the proper alternative to the 
alliance they despise (230, Note 7).  
They continue, in another note: 
There is a fundamental dichotomy between the conception of man as a self-
producing being and conception of ‘human nature’. This constitutes a decisive 
anthropological difference between Marx and any properly sociological per-
spective on the one hand (especially one that is grounded in Meadian social 
psychology) and Freud and most non-Freudian psychological perspectives on 
the other (220, Note 7).  
It is a bit strange, in view of Berger and Luckmann’s ambitious project, to 
launch such theoretical demarcations in a note. I tend to see these comments as 
symptoms of a latent awareness of a problem – a stone in the shoe – a problem 
that has not been thematized before but presses itself into the horizon of Berger 
and Luckmann’s otherwise extremely embracing and integrative work.  
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The point about Freud is beyond dispute, but also obsolete. Apart from the 
one work mentioned we may after all assume that most of the psychoanalysts 
that European Marxists approached in the 1960s already theorized psychody-
namics socially, and were politically and theoretically committed to an eman-
cipatory thinking in which human agency and consciousness was essential (e.g. 
Mitscherlich 1963). Berger and Luckmann might also have noticed, at the 
opposite side of the gorge, Erikson’s development of a cultural psychology 
(1950) as an attempt to understand the dialectic between the individual and 
society on a psychoanalytic ground – although in the first place limited to child 
socialization and kept within a developmental psychology framework. In Eu-
rope the ethnopsychoanalysts simultaneously analyzed the dialectic between 
individual and society in the remote Dogon culture (Parin, Morgenthaler and 
Parin-Matthèy 1963), de facto defining personality structures as a result of 
cultural environment – later generalized into a revised psychodynamic theory 
(Parin 1983).  
These comments from Berger and Luckmann (1966) remind about the fun-
damental challenge connected with the conception of subjectivity and the rela-
tion between individual and society in a social science landscape where the 
disciplinary domains separated knowledge of the individual from knowledge 
about society. It may also reflect an enduring prejudiced tendency to see psy-
choanalysis as a closed community, not recognizing the very fundamental 
ongoing discussions between Freudian psychoanalysts and several re-
interpretations of the origins of the inner psychic structures. In this landscape it 
appears even more remarkable, that Alfred Lorenzer developed a theory which 
took the challenge to develop a social reinterpretation of Freud’s basic ideas on 
a materialistic ground which might easily be mistaken for a biological and 
deterministic in the way Berger and Luckmann obviously see the psychoanaly-
sis.  
When we have focused on Lorenzer within a broad and multiple tradition of 
combining a Marxian analysis of society (Frankfurt School critical theory) and 
psycho-dynamic theorizing of the subject it had two interrelated reasons. One is 
that he has been particularly productive for the development of a methodology 
of empirical qualitative research. The other one is that his socialization theory 
by focusing on language at the same time as maintaining a clearly materialistic 
view on the body as well as on the socio-material structure of society has pro-
vided a key contribution to theoretical and epistemological issues of social 
science, that have become articulated much later. We shall come back to this at 
the end of this article.  
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2.  Alfred Lorenzer‘s Intellectual Journey  
Alfred Lorenzer (1922-2002) came from the background of being a medical 
psychiatrist, trained in psychoanalysis on a Freudian background. As a doctor 
and psychoanalyst, he took an early interest in societal critique and cultural 
theory, taking to task the Frankfurt school of thought and its critical theory. 
Understanding subjective structure as influenced by societal conditions increas-
ingly came to dominate his theoretical thoughts. As early as 1970, he criticized 
the psychoanalytical concept of “symbol” (1970a), placed it in a linguistic 
science context (1970b), and subsequently expanded the application of it into 
socialization theory (1972), epistemology (1974) and cultural analysis (1986). 
The red thread of his contribution is to provide a ground for a social interpreta-
tion of the basic psychodynamic forces without giving up the radical insights in 
Freud’s theory. The first step in this chain from psychoanalysis to societal 
theory was an interactionist theory of socialization (1972) in which he recon-
ceptualized these psychodynamic forces which in classical psychoanalysis 
since Freud were seen as biological, result of natural drives. Lorenzer estab-
lished a dialectical theory according to which they were results of the social 
interaction, in the first place between infant and mother (caring person), and 
thereby also enabled an understanding of the unconscious – the most radical 
element in psychoanalysis – as a result of the symbolic interaction. The follow-
ing works developed methodological ideas for an endogenous understanding of 
the subjective dimensions of social interaction and language – quite opposite to 
the direction Freud took in meta-psychological and cultural theory.  
The point of departure in Lorenzer’s relevance to current theoretical, social 
and political issues is the Copernican turn of the Freudian theory which had 
been initiated by a number of psychoanalysts: In continuation of Freud he 
analyzes the development of the structure of personality as “representing expe-
riences of bodily interactions” (1972, 17). But whereas Freud saw their impact 
in the psyche, as predominantly distortion, disturbance and blocking of (biolog-
ical) drives in the subject Lorenzer sees these social interactions and the bodily 
experiences of them as a dialectical shaping of the drives into a subject, and the 
resulting psychic dynamics as highly social phenomena. The individual sensual 
experiences of social relations and meanings in immediate interaction are con-
nected with the wider social world in the form of symbols. The issues of psy-
chotherapy, disturbances of the psychic development, were reinterpreted as 
disturbances of the possibility to symbolize individual sensual experiences in 
socially recognized language. Lorenzer’s critical reinterpretation of the psychic 
disturbances are expressed in the early book titles “Zur Kritik des psychoana-
lytischen Symbolbegriffs” [“Critique of the Psychoanalytic Concept of Sym-
bol”] (1970a) and “Sprachzerstörung und Rekonstruktion” [“Language De-
struction and Reconstruction”] (1970b). On the one hand enabling a 
reinterpretation of the psychotherapeutic task, this critique on the other hand 
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opens a new way of theorizing the psychodynamic aspects of societal relations. 
Symbolic/cultural meaning (for the individual) is seen as a complex mediation 
of social interaction and sensual experience, and has conscious as well as un-
conscious aspects. Later Lorenzer developed further his key concept of “inter-
action forms” to understand the inner, pre-linguistic experiences of practices 
and relations. These interaction forms are connected with the socially recog-
nized language to form symbolic interaction forms, and the developing of ca-
pacity for symbolic production can be seen as an integrated aspect of socializa-
tion. This understanding of the early socialization process enables Lorenzer to 
see language, interaction and bodily (drive) processes in their wider societal 
context – and we can add an epistemological perspective: In the context of a 
constructivist social science it enables us to see how ideas about societal rela-
tions are embodied in the individual socialization. Lorenzer’s thoughts on the 
role of language in subject constitution build on the theorem of language 
games, which he took up from the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and devel-
oped further. Language is anchored in concrete social practice in a dialectic 
unit of language use, everyday life practice and view of the world (Weber 
2010). Language games are thus defined as the interface at which subjective 
and objective structures interact. The question of the constitution of language 
games is, therefore, also one which addresses the constitution of the relation-
ship between individual and society. Looked at in this way, language and 
awareness are inseparably linked with social practice. If the constitution of 
language games is seen as integral to the development of subjective structures 
under objective conditions, then the individual subject can be understood and 
deciphered using its ex ante social reference.  
Lorenzer’s contribution to the methodology gains a wider perspective by 
theorizing the genesis of the correspondence between unconscious dynamics in 
the subject and unconscious or unintended dimensions of societal and cultural 
processes. What is in the first place mainly a material theory of socialization – 
which unlike many other theories does not see the social shaping of the indi-
vidual as assimilation to social structure – is in the second place a radical epis-
temology of societal dynamics. Lorenzer’s theory of language games and his 
meta-psychological and methodological notions are closely linked with the 
search for opportunities for epistemic reconstruction of suppressed social rela-
tionships, which are (societally) imprinted in the (many individual) psyches 
and in their interaction. Lorenzer in brief draws the attention to the hermeneutic 
methodology of psychoanalytic understanding. The immediate inspiration is 
offered by an interpretation of interaction and cultural meaning in a way in-
spired by psychoanalytic interpretation, namely “scenic understanding” whose 
further methodological foundations and methodical implementation will be 
taken up further in this article. Lorenzer separates the methodological princi-
ples of psychoanalysis – simultaneous attention, free association and the con-
cepts of transfer and counter-transfer – from the clinical context of doctor-
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patient relationships, and transfers them to social and cultural scientific prac-
tice. He thus emphasizes the methodological experience as opposed to direct 
transfers of theoretical models since, in his view, these cannot be transferred 
from one field to another.  
The socialization theory was Lorenzer’s first distinguishing contribution. It 
builds the theoretical foundation for the development of a psycho-societal 
interpretation method with inspiration from the psycho-analytical interpretation 
of individuals. During the 1970’s his work was widely cited and read both in 
Germany and abroad (notably the Scandinavian countries) and today, his ideas 
continue to inform a vigorous tradition of cultural analysis and social research 
(Leithäuser and Volmerg 1988; Leithäuser 1976; Morgenroth 1990, 2010; 
Bereswill 2008; Lorenzer 1970a, 1970b, 1972, 1974, 1977, 1986, 2006;  
Prokop, Friese and Stach 2009). A number of Scandinavian, especially Danish 
researchers have published work directly referring to this tradition, or using the 
methods more or less in accordance with it, most of it published in Danish (for 
an overview see Weber 1996, 2007, 2009, 2010; Salling Olesen 2004, 2007a, 
2007b, 2011; Salling Olesen and Weber 2001, 2002). However, Lorenzer is 
little known outside German speaking communities. For a long time, only one 
small example of his work has been published in English translation (Lorenzer 
and Orban 1978). Later another text has been introduced, translated and posted 
in the internet (Lorenzer 2002a [1981]; Schaffrik 2002). But “in-depth herme-
neutic analysis” remains largely unfamiliar to English-speaking audiences. 
When we in a joint research network explored the parallels between this tradi-
tion and pioneering work in the Anglophone psycho-social research (e.g. 
Hollway and Jefferson 2000), the language based a-symmetry was obvious and 
it seemed imperative to provide access to some of the non-Anglophone re-
search tradition to a wider audience.  
In the following we will concentrate on the methodological impulse from 
cultural analysis in social research. In a late stage of his work, in the key text in 
“KulturAnalysen” [Cultural Analyses] (1986), he coins the (title)notion of 
“Tiefenhermeneutische Kulturanalyse” [In-depth Hermeneutic Cultural Analy-
sis], which focuses on the systematic reconstruction of unconscious meaning 
dimensions in analysis of literary texts. This text played a significant role in the 
intensive multilingual discourse in our research network between Danish, Ger-
man and British researchers, of which half were not German-speaking, facili-
tated by a translation (by Mechthild Bereswill and Christine Morgenroth, un-
published). The book as a whole is a collective work with a number of case 
studies, mainly on literary texts, but also one (by Søren Nagbøl) extending the 
horizon to architecture. “KulturAnalysen” [“Cultural Analyses”] (1986) sum-
marizes the contribution of his interaction theory extensions of psychoanalysis 
from the 1960s and 1970s and may be read as the key text to the complex meta-
theoretical ideas that have proven useful in empirical studies in many areas of 
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social life under the general heading of “Tiefenhermeneutik” [In-depth Herme-
neutic] (1986).  
Lorenzer believes this is where what he calls the “hard and provocative 
work” (1986, 16f.) in the psychoanalytical critique of society and culture en-
ters. He sees the position of psychoanalysis between differing disciplines 
against whose borders it grates. The “conflict potential” of a psychoanalytic 
approach traditionally arises from revealing the social constraints a subject 
faces, but, more importantly, how desires and past experiences may influence 
e.g. cultural productions like literature. Lorenzer here emphasizes the differ-
ence between a therapeutic and a social or literary discovery process:  
Where therapy is concerned, the origin [of the subject] is investigated by ask-
ing: how did the conflict arise in the case of this individual? In cultural analy-
sis, however, the question is: what kind of conflict are we dealing with? The 
focus is on the conflict between unconscious desires and conscious values 
(67).  
In fact the notion of conflict in the last sentence might be a bit misleading in 
translation – in Lorenzer’s German text it reads “Auseinandersetzung 
zwischen,” which implies “intensive interrelation” or “interaction between” in 
the sense of connecting rather than a conflict between two independent oppos-
ing parties, or in philosophical terms: It is an intrinsic rather than an extrinsic 
relation. In Lorenzer’s thinking the relation between the conscious and the 
unconscious levels of the subject is more complex than just being a conflict. 
They are both influenced by experiences in the past, and conscious and uncon-
scious dynamics interrelate in the ongoing processing of cognitive and emo-
tional aspects of experiences. Unconscious dynamics which refer to contradic-
tions experienced in the past (and hence of cultural and societal nature), which 
may have become unconscious, while their conflictual meaning may have been 
transferred to another content are particularly important in the original thera-
peutic context. But the very existence of unconscious dynamics which are of 
cultural and societal nature, and the fact that they remain in interaction with 
meaning making and conscious engagements in the present is the important 
insight for interpretation of social interaction and cultural meanings. Lorenzer 
and his colleagues eventually demonstrates this potential in interpretation of 
arts products, but the insights in societal nature of the subjective processes 
opens a door to interpret not only cultural products, but to interpret interviews 
and other qualitative material from empirical research of a wide range of more 
profane social practices and spheres.  
3.  In-Depth Hermeneutic Cultural Analysis 
Alfred Lorenzer’s introduction article “Tiefenhermeneutische Kulturanalysen” 
in the book “KulturAnalysen” (1986) is as close as he comes to spell out a 
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methodology. Basically he points to the hermeneutic (interpretational) nature of 
the form of understanding which is used in psychoanalytical therapeutic prac-
tice, generalizes it in what he calls the “scenic understanding,” and comments 
the nature of this transformation. The particular value of these thoughts mainly 
become evident in reflecting a research practice by means of researchers sub-
jectively engaging in the interpretation, tracing aspects of social relations 
which are not immediately visible and may be not even conscious for social 
actors. For this reason we developed an interpretation process example of a text 
which had been presented in the research group. In the following this sample 
scene and our interpretation of it will be used for illustration linking our inter-
pretation steps along this short sequence with central passages of Lorenzer’s 
text. As it usually is the case the interpretation process became an illustration in 
itself – interpretation requires the engagement of the interpreters in an interac-
tion with the text which transcends the obvious meaning of the text, and hence 
becomes part of the interpretation in itself. We took up a brief scene presented 
in the Dubrovnik workshops by our British colleague Joanne Whitehouse, who 
used qualitative methods to study a popular yet highly contested form of media 
product – the reality TV program Big Brother, which has sparked heated debate 
not just in Great Britain (Redmann and Whitehouse-Hare 2008). We wanted to 
illustrate Lorenzer’s methodological and meta-theoretical reflections using an 
empirical example from the discipline of cultural studies to show what scenic 
understanding might mean for empirical analysis.  
We analyzed the reaction of a female viewer as portrayed in the following 
scene. We interpreted the scene as a representation, not as a factual account that 
can be read at face value, and not as a transparent subjective expression. We 
assumed that such representations are based on shared cultural experience and 
provide us with access to subjective and social dynamics, which we attempt to 
reveal with the aid of Lorenzer’s thinking.  
The structure of this type of program is a closed group who is monitored in 
their interaction, and the viewers are invited to vote about who should be sent 
home at each stage of the show. An interviewee, Lou, reported (to Joanne) that 
she had been watching an episode of Big Brother. One of the housemates, 
Jonny, offered a second housemate, Adele, a cup of coffee. Adele refused in a 
friendly fashion but as Jonny walked away she mouthed the words “Fuck off” 
to his retreating back. The interviewee, Lou, was so outraged by what she took 
to be Adele’s two-faced behavior that she decided she would vote to have 
Adele evicted from the show and, moreover, that she had to do this straight 
away. Because her own phone was out of order she rushed from the house to 
use a public phone box on the corner of her street. Unfortunately, the phone 
box was occupied and, feeling increasingly frustrated, the interviewee started 
banging on the phone box door telling the person using it to hurry up. “I just 
wanted her (i.e. Adele) out,” she explained in the interview.  
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At first glance the text we looked at irritates and confuses, displays a re-
markable amount of emotion and contains a variety of action and interaction 
levels which all run together. It may also provoke normative reactions in the 
interpreter, not least as regards the contested TV format that attracts large 
numbers of viewers. The scientific and popular controversies concerning a 
program like Big Brother thus point to underlying issues of subject and society 
in the context of social change: on the one hand the age-old discussion about 
how much influence mass media has in guiding people’s actions, on the other 
hand the much more interesting question about how the contents of the media 
engage with the subjective issues of the audiences.  
The manifest meaning of the sequence is readily visible: we are witness to 
an emotionally loaded reaction in the context of a medially presented group 
player game. The structure of sequence the constitutes a dual scene: contestants 
in the containers and contestants in front on the TV enter into a relationship 
with one another whereby the quality of their relationships is the key to further 
exclusion or inclusion of individual players. In other words, the publicly cele-
brated relationships between the inhabitants of the container give the viewers a 
chance to enter into a relationship which forms the basis for their decision on 
whether or not to vote for or against a particular contestant.  
There are several simplistic interpretations of the scene which are near at 
hand (and the interpreting group did not evade the temptation in the first place): 
we could interpret it as a confirmation of a culturally pessimistic standpoint 
concerning the increasing degeneration of the mass media, or in a more or less 
psychological sense as an expression of a threatened if not damaged subjectivi-
ty which comes to light with the loss of key self-determination skills. Although 
different in focus they both leave little space for understanding subjective 
agency. In a way they treat the social agent as a patient and diagnose his/her 
vulnerability for social conditions. Alfred Lorenzer provides the theoretical 
arguments for avoiding such premature classifications. In Lorenzer’s work, we 
read that apart from the manifest and latent meaning levels “texts” house an 
unconscious meaning dimension which we can enter as readers, as observers or 
as researchers.  
The impulse in psychoanalytical therapy is to change the patient who is being 
analyzed. In the reader-text relationship the opposite is the case. Here it is the 
reader/analyst who is subject to change. If the reader as an interpreter 
acknowledges the emotional power of the text and does not stand in awe of it, 
his consciousness will be changed – at least, this is the case if he does not 
abuse the text-reader relationship by simply reading into the text a pre-existing 
and well known version of psychoanalysis (1986, 28; our translation).  
This distinction takes our attention in another direction. We concern ourselves 
with the emotional power of the text and thus with the relationships it offers to 
the readers. How do we as interpreters take up this offer? How do we react to 
Lou’s description – normatively, amused or intrigued? This line of thinking 
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may be easily accepted when dealing with “fine arts” – it resonances discus-
sions about the criteria of quality in poetry, e.g. – but here we deal with a pro-
fane narrative about profane television watching. Posing these questions to the 
interpreters of the short research scene led us away from commenting and 
classifying the actions in the actual text per se, and towards its emotional quali-
ties and evocative power in relation to the reader. And further the question of 
the ‘relationship between text and reader’ applies to the relation between the 
Big Brother-show and its viewers, in this case to Lou. What is it that makes her 
act so impulsively? If we go by what she says, then contestant Adele’s two-
faced attitude is what made Lou want to vote Adele immediately off the show 
and head out to find a telephone. According to Lou, Adele’s behavior, which 
she describes as two-faced and underhandedly aggressive, sparked her unbri-
dled anger; she is openly aggressive and attacks another person within her 
action radius.  
The theoretical distinction of psychoanalysis is the theory of the uncon-
scious (Freud 1957 [1915]). It is actually a more complicated theory about 
levels of (un)consciousness with grey zones and displacements, which in 
Freud’s version is a precondition for the therapeutic process as well as for the 
interpretation of dreams. The first methodical issue is to gain access to this 
level, not with an individual therapeutic aim, but in order to understand its 
social meaning. The interpretation of texts, be they literary works, field notes 
or excerpts from interviews, also constitutes a multilayered scene. In the case in 
question, we reconstruct a dual scene in which various interaction dynamics 
overlay one another and create a new scene in which we as interpreters become 
involved relative to those dynamics. We find Lou’s extreme over-reaction 
difficult to understand and tend to distance ourselves from it.  
Lorenzer goes on to say that literary texts contain a provocation which goes 
beyond individual and biographically specific reception patterns and points to 
societal, collective motives and meaning substance:  
The provocation lies in content in the text itself. As such, its impact goes be-
yond the individual, it is perhaps societal-collective [gesellschaftlich-
kollektiv], possibly even spread over many epochs. The unconscious in litera-
ture under consideration, is a collective unconscious, although admittedly not 
in Jung’s sense. It consists of praxis figures [Praxisfiguren], which – as it 
were – demand to enter consciousness, and contains forms of life [Lebens-
formen], whose access to general consciousness has been barred and whose 
value, in consequence, has not been openly tried out (1986, 28; our transla-
tion).  
In interactionist (social) reinterpretations of psychoanalytical theory, including 
Lorenzer’s theory of socialization, the unconscious level is just as much as the 
conscious a result of life history experience of social interaction. For the same 
reason the unconscious is assumed to contain a potential for social imagination 
which goes beyond the actual state of consciousness – either because it con-
tains interaction experiences that have later been excluded from consciousness, 
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or because it contains anticipating ideas of something “emerging” which has 
not yet been realized in social practice. Continuing the previous quotation 
Lorenzer says: 
These not-yet-conscious [Noch-nicht-bewusst] praxis figures – as Bloch says – 
generate a utopian potential. It is the work of hermeneutics to reveal this uto-
pian potential and, in so doing, to take a stand against petrified circumstances 
[versteinerte Verhältnisse]. [...] Why do we prefer the term in-depth herme-
neutics to characterize this approach? The answer is: because the practice of 
in-depth hermeneutics is the distinctive feature of psychoanalytical interpreta-
tion. ... The in-depth element of the hermeneutic approach is only to be found 
in psychoanalysis and underlines the central subject of psychoanalytical in-
quiry: the unconscious (1986, 28; our translation). 
Lorenzer’s understanding of the critical and utopian potentials in the uncon-
scious articulates an important dimension in the thinking of critical theory or 
Frankfurt school. The Frankfurt school generally sees theorizing and critique as 
a key to social imagination and utopian ideas. And since this thinking is based 
on materialist assumptions it means that imagination is endogenous, i.e. must 
be discovered and articulated from within societal reality, as it is condensed in 
Adorno’s argument in the positivist dispute:  
But if theory is not to fall prey to the dogmatism over whose discovery scepti-
cism – now elevated to a prohibition on thought – is always ready to rejoice, 
then theory may not rest here. It must transform the concepts which it brings, 
as it were, from outside into those which the objects has of itself, into what the 
object, left to itself, seeks to be, and confront it with what it is (1976 [1969], 
69).  
In Habermas’ thinking the term of ideology critique spells out the need to re-
veal endogenous potentials for societal change through a critical analysis of 
social realities themselves. Change does not come from above or from outside. 
But whereas Habermas first of all sees the key in deconstructing observation 
and reflection of “petrified social relations” and the societal institutions which 
make up the guises of power, social inequality and reified relations Alfred 
Lorenzer looks for the potentials in socialized psyche, in the dynamics between 
the conscious and the unconscious. And this brings the argument back to the 
text:  
Does this imply that the unconscious is the sole aim of psychoanalytical inter-
pretation and that every ‘manifest/apparent meaning’, every deliberately in-
tended meaning of the text the author makes, has no significance? Indeed not, 
such an approach would not justify the title of a psychoanalytical literary and 
cultural analysis. This collection of analyses shows that the manifest meaning 
in no way can be seen as a ‘ladder’, which can be put aside in the moment you 
have reached the goal ‘deep down there’ (1986, 29; our translation).  
Lorenzer’s theoretical deliberations point to socially taboo, degenerate life-
styles and utopian moments of social practice which while being unconsciously 
maintained also emerge to influence [our] conscious, for example with the help 
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of literary texts. Their provocation, according to Lorenzer, lies in the fact that 
they transport aspects of a collective unconscious which forces itself into the 
conscious. On the one hand Lou’s arguments concerning Adele’s two-faced 
behavior lines up seamlessly with the socially accepted meaning pattern of 
good or bad behavior. But the emotional charge “beyond the boundaries of 
language” in the vehement desire to be rid of the other woman goes far beyond 
such socially acknowledge configuration. To have Adele thrown off the show, 
Lou is prepared to throw an unknown stranger out of the telephone box.  
So what is it that forces itself into consciousness? The TV show (cultural 
meaning) elicits unconscious desires and identifications (interaction forms) 
which influence the agency and produces an intense ambivalence. The recon-
struction of this ambivalence helps to reveal the unconscious in the text. We 
will address the interpretation procedure in more detail later. For the time be-
ing, however, we will stay with the relationship between manifest and latent 
meaning and read what Lorenzer thinks:  
... the distinguishing feature of psychoanalytical cultural analysis as an ‘in-
depth hermeneutic’ is about the recognition of an independent level of mean-
ing below the meaning generating level of language symbolism. While the 
manifest meaning resides in the socially recognized figures of consciousness, 
a level of unconscious interaction forms [Interaktionsformen] is pushed into 
consciousness on the level of latent meaning. It is certainly the case that this 
level of meaning, ‘excluded by consciousness and social consensus’, is one in 
which psychoanalysis was originally interested, and which Freud counted to 
parapraxes. But, at the same time, the manifest text-meaning is still important 
– as the counterpart to what is concealed-forbidden. Manifest- and latent-text 
meaning construct a contradictory pair, which psychoanalysis must seek to re-
solve [aufzuheben hat] (1986, 29; our translation).  
For cultural analysis, when unconscious interaction forms are pushed to the 
consciousness it means that the latent meaning of a text offers a potential ac-
cess to understand collective dimensions of the unconscious. Manifest and 
latent meaning are dialectically related because language use point to non-
verbal or pre-verbal dimensions of social interaction as Lorenzer describes in 
the concept of “unconscious interaction forms.” It does not mean that we can 
simply identify the unconscious and the non-verbal: unconscious meanings are 
in the text as latent meaning or meaning potentials.  
If we look at the construction of the show – and numerous other shows of 
the same type – as performance of interaction, and at the same time an invita-
tion to interaction with the viewer the point is that the show invites the viewer 
to exert some kind of control in the limited world in the container – and in this 
case make a moral judgment on the behavior of the figures in the show. How-
ever, he/she can only do it in the dichotomous form of voting out or in. You are 
not only invited to make a regressive simplification of complex issues, you are 
forced to do it, if you want to participate in the interaction. So the relation 
between the inner logic of the show and the seemingly extreme actions of the 
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Lou – and in the second place the evocative power of the text in relation to the 
interpreting researchers – might be a key to trace the unconscious meanings. 
Lorenzer’s attempts to characterize the unconscious:  
The unconscious is a non-verbal, non-symbolic system of meaning, which is 
contrary to individuals’ linguistic order ... It is  
- ‘autonomous’, because it comes into existence within specific and concrete 
mutual exchanges and is therefore the inscription of this particular ontogenesis  
- ‘systematic’, because from the first moment in a life-history, one memory trace 
follows another each becoming interwoven with the other [organismisch]  
- ‘meaning’-full because the engrams are simultaneously the sedimented forms of 
past social interplay and drafts for that of the future (1986, 46-7).  
In this framework Lou’s disturbingly excessive action that lends the scene 
structure can be interpreted as systematic and meaningful in the context of 
biographical patterns. Autonomous elements prove to be the physical action, 
leaving the house, the purposeful movement in space, the hammering against 
the door of the telephone box. The TV show seems to set a subject’s past inter-
action experiences in motion, which defy any language based symbolization 
yet remain registered as a bodily experience of social interaction. The reactiva-
tion of these interaction forms happens not in the sense of simple repetition of 
old conflicts, but as part of a dynamic interaction between old, past and new, 
current interaction experiences. The unconscious meaning of the scene points 
to something which is unexpressed and yet symptomatic. In the first place it 
evaded the perception of interpreters and gave way to irritation and premature 
classification of the subjectivity of only one actor in the scene (Lou). This 
individual psychological interpretation saw impaired ego functions: reality 
checks and emotional control are rendered ineffective and an archaic break-
through of revenge impulses.  
But if we look at the scene in the context of its multilayered structure, a 
structural double bind comes to light which neither the contestant in the con-
tainer nor the voting viewer (like Lou) can escape: friendly, polite and civil 
behavior stands in diametric opposition to the competitive nature of the game 
and the dilemma it entails. Against this backdrop, Lou’s rather excessive reac-
tion can be seen to perform the role assigned to her by the TV-show. But they 
may also encompass anticipations of future behavior and interaction scenarios 
– imaginations about a transparent and preferably dominance-free communica-
tion – her reaction is a response to the unfulfilled desire for civility towards 
others, which Lou believes Adele is failing to demonstrate. Paradoxically she is 
driven to the opposite extreme and resorts to violence herself.  
This interpretation of the unconscious in the text refers to experiences prior 
to the development of the ability to symbolize, yet they retain their effective-
ness in scenic arrangements. But it does not mean simply that uncon-
scious/conscious is the same as pre-language/linguistic – the relation is more 
complex:  
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The term ‘configuration of practice figures’ [Gefüge von Praxisfiguren] refers 
to the following characteristic. The interplay from which memory traces (in-
teraction-forms) emerge is nothing but the exchange of gestures, bodily 
movement, and socially shaped and significant body processes: it is ‘practice’. 
Every interaction-form is part of this practice, and therefore encompasses but 
goes beyond language. Practice as a whole is to some extent, submitted to the 
rules of language, but also partly resistant and reluctant, or is part of some-
thing utopic not-yet-conscious, i.e. part of human behavior that has not be-
come encompassed in language (1986, 47; our translation).  
But how do we store these non-language-related memory traces, and how can 
we approach them in the interpretation? The following section explains Lo-
renzuer’s theory regarding the constitution of the scene in the context of intra- 
and intersubjectivity and the role played by the body and language. The follow-
ing section returns to the methodological implementation in “scenic under-
standing.”  
4.  Engrams, Interaction Forms and the Language Game 
At a very early stage in his theoretical writings, Alfred Lorenzer meant that 
interaction experiences become embodied during the embryonic phase and the 
first few months of life. Thus, through the body’s senso-motoric reactions, they 
help to shape specific and later-life experiences. Such interaction patterns 
which become ingrained in the body stand for an entire lifetime in a constant 
dialectic with the discursive demands of the social environment which are 
subsequently communicated through language. The start of this development in 
very early childhood is both a physical and a holistic process based entirely on 
sensory perceptions. In Lorenzer’s own words, this means that:  
The ‘visual’, ‘tactile’, ‘acoustic’ denote modes of sensory reception, which are 
directed by the central nervous system from the periphery of the body and 
which are then stored in precisely defined ‘areas of the brain’ (...). The in-
scription of these visual, tactile and acoustic impressions happens via ‘en-
grams’. These engrams are ‘memory traces’ in Freud’s terms. Although this 
process is common to all infants, of course, the engrams of a single person are 
the memory traces of his or her experience as a particular individual. They 
have an individual profile. Just as Freud pointed out, in front of his time, in his 
book on ‘Aphasie’ (Freud 1891), that cerebral physiological functions and 
‘psychological’ content cannot be separated it is obviously the experiences of 
the memory traces which are codified as engrams. And this means that the 
contents of memory (which is, of course, social) modifies the brain’s physio-
logical structures of the nervous system. And of course the memory traces 
combine into ideas of objects. And like the sensual impressions – visual, tac-
tile, acoustic – combine into an idea of object, likewise will the objects that 
are perceived in different situations combine to form definite and concrete 
scenes. But this is expressed inaccurately: Of course it is the scene which is 
the immediate subject of the infant’s experience. An awareness of individual 
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objects only emerges from the scene gradually, and may later, in differing sit-
uations, combine to form well defined poles and stable figures within the sce-
nic Gestalt (1986, 41-2; our translation and italics).  
Memory traces are non-verbal references to life practice, of experiences. These 
experiences are based on the efforts to achieve pleasure and avoid unpleasure. 
Lorenzer emphasizes the “bodilyness” of these processes. Lorenzer’s theory of 
the language development and the notion of scenic understanding are actually 
in this sense coming close to contemporary cognitive science and the new 
synthesis between “human” and “biological” understanding of the brain  
(Lorenzer 2002b). Looked at today, he anticipates a paradigm shift in the view 
of the brain as a holistic system (Peled 2008; Leuzinger-Bohleber 1998). In 
memory research, embodied cognitive science has moved away from the notion 
of the human brain being a kind of computer designed to process information. 
Memory is now understood as an active process involving the entire organism 
and based on senso-motoric emotion coordination processes which occur in 
direct relationship with constantly adapting re-categorization processes. In 
Lorenzer’s terms, this means that a child’s early experiences of stimulus re-
sponse games with its mother and other close individuals are retained as 
memory traces, as specific interaction forms. They are a lasting, natural im-
pression of genuine social interaction forms in the subject. This is what  
Lorenzer calls “socialized nature.”  
But how do single memory traces become a configuration of many which 
evolve into life experiences and a complete life world? The notion of the scenic 
primacy poses the question the other way round. Experience is holistic, strong-
ly shaped by sensory impressions and by satisfying (or their opposite) experi-
ences. “The scene takes shape step by step through alternating and mutually 
constitutive interactions between changing and unchanging modes of experi-
ences” (1986, 42, our translation).  
The self-correction in the quotation (Paragraph 35, italics) is interesting – it 
seems that Lorenzer here moves from one way of seeing the development of 
consciousness – as a combination of sensual elements into images of objects – 
to another, more holistic, in which an undifferentiated scenic experience orient-
ed by the subject-to-be – gradually evolves through differentiation to become 
more detailed and stable object images, and it seems as if the self-correction is 
a trace of this theory development. The new conception aligns with empirically 
based knowledge about infancy development (Stern 1985). The process de-
scribed always involves bodily processes:  
If we take bodily processes into account, three aspects of the scenic become 
apparent  
1) The imprint of situational experience [Situationserfahrung] is assimilated by an 
internal ensemble of tactile, acoustic etc. receptors. Likewise the receptor en-
semble depicts the panorama of real impressions in the internal scenic composi-
tion of the engrams.  
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2) Even if not from the first moment but very early these situational engrams re-
peatedly go beyond the inevitable dialectic that exists between bodily sensations 
and their counter-impulses. The memory trace [Erinnerungsspur] is more than 
the consequence of a simple process of stimulus-response; in itself it already has 
sensorimotor qualities. A simple illustration of this scenic composition of sen-
sorimotor experience formation is to be found in the banal fact that the stimulus 
is sure to provoke its reaction. For example, the noise of a mouse ‘results’ in the 
cat turning its head.  
3) And the foundation for all this is in the scenic unity between the ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’, between the organism and its environment ... This interplay is the 
foundation for everything. It remains the basic model, from which we will also 
later have to depart (Lorenzer 1986, 43; our translation).   
The scene is thus shaped by the bodily referent inherent in it from the outset. A 
child’s earliest perception, no doubt while still in the womb, is a holistic expe-
rience. The perceptive instruments are an ensemble of receptors which give the 
external world in intra-psychical space a scenic structure. The bodily processes 
described by Lorenzer should not, however, be seen as natural or ingrained 
reflexes, even if they seem quite similar. The senso-motoric process can be 
readily recognized in a nursing mother whose milk production is activated the 
moment her child cries and not when the hungry child starts to suck at her 
breast. The baby’s interactive need, the stimulus, is perceived and understood 
by the mother as a holistic experience, and her body responds immediately – 
holistically, scenically and faster than it could ever be triggered by any con-
scious decision. But they are learned in social interaction.  
Hence, this describes the scenic unit between the organism and its environ-
ment. The scene always encompasses both, “internal” and “external,” and 
supports the statement that “this interplay is the foundation for everything.” 
Such interplay provides the basis for human experience, it remains both active 
and necessary one’s whole life long and constitutes an ever-more discerning 
ability to take in new experiences.  
Let us concentrate on the original experience: the scenic interplay and its ef-
fect on human development. This interplay, whether occurring within pre-
natal, post-natal or familial constellations, has two fundamental qualities: sat-
isfying and unsatisfying/harmful. In consequence, human development occurs 
against the background of ‘ananke’, the basic human state of vulnerability. 
Humans in particular are dependent on a constantly flowing and satisfying ex-
change with their environment. This is very obvious at the outset of life, but it 
continues thereafter ...This state of dependency keeps this interplay going and 
pushes it in the direction of the satisfaction of needs. Long before this com-
pass orientating us to the satisfaction of needs is laid down, there still exists a 
requirement that needs are met. The basic human state of vulnerability is the 
source of the drive towards exchange and interplay: the first fundamental con-
tent of this drive is directed towards satisfying interactions and the defense 
against unsatisfying and damaging ones. The drive is therefore the urge both 
to accept and seek out specific interactions fulfilling and satisfying needs. It is 
clear that such requirement and needs have their origin in bodily metabolism. 
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The need for human contact evolves from this. Sexual needs bear witness to 
these bodily origins (44).  
Lorenzer defines drive as the ensemble of all efforts to achieve satisfaction. 
This satisfaction is only achievable in social relationships – also for the most 
basic biological needs. The active search for satisfying interaction with the 
social environment, including specific individuals with whom a relationship is 
formed, shapes a structure of “specific interaction forms.” It is the memory 
traces of satisfying experiences which, in interplay between “internal” and 
“external,” achieve their unmistakable form and subsequently become an en-
semble, a formation. Lorenzer maintains the biological dimension of the drive 
theory by emphasizing the pleasure-unpleasure principle. At the same time he 
integrates the theory into a new view of early social interactions whose ongoing 
importance he develops in the interplay between the internal and external, 
between biological needs and the social forms in which they can be satisfied 
and are reconfigured.  
This dialectic gives rise to the life-long development dynamic of the subject 
in interaction with other subjects and the world. But at what point does lan-
guage come into the game? The early pre-verbal, scenically stored interaction 
experiences, the “specific interaction forms,” gradually include verbal images 
which appear in the interaction. Simple (pre-symbolic) interaction forms and 
spoken words, which are in themselves holistic and situated entities of mean-
ing, defined in social interaction, are the material for the development of a 
symbolic level. Alfred Lorenzer takes up this link between interaction form and 
verbal images, as a process of symbol-building and emphasizes that:  
Again: word and interaction together construct the language symbol. There-
fore I have called this a ‘language symbolic interaction form’ [Sprachsymbol-
ische Interaktionsform]. When word and interaction are joined in this way 
practice is – via language – fully at our disposal (50; our translation).  
The ‘power of language to regulate practice’ when oriented outwardly encom-
passes what we term ‘action’ or ‘conscious perception’. However, when ori-
ented inwardly we term it ‘internal reflection’, ‘conscious emotion’ etc. In re-
lation to the task of psychoanalysis, we can now begin to see what is meant by 
‘language destruction and reconstruction’: the separation of the unit of lan-
guage and practice and conversely the therapeutic attempt at their restitution 
(51; our translation).  
Only when a complex of sounds has found its appropriate place in the context 
of the language-sign, and the syntactic level of language links with the prag-
matic and semantic nature of language, only when this is accomplished a full 
language figure [Sprachfigur] that corresponds with the scenic practice figure 
has been established. Only then the language figure has assumed the nature of 
scenic representation (52-3; our translation).   
When the interaction form in this way is symbolically expressed and thus gains 
access to the conscious it enables reflection on one’s own behavior and pro-
vides the conditions necessary for reasoned tentative action. Only with lan-
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guage does this become clearer: language symbolic interaction forms integrate 
social practice in a more comprehensive and differentiated organization frame-
work.  
This notion leads directly to the concept of the language game Lorenzer de-
veloped after Wittgenstein. The latter defined the language game as a dialectic 
unit of life practice, language use and world view (2009 [1953]). Wittgen-
stein’s language game notion was in fact primarily critical to previous philo-
sophical ideas of language and scientific statements, seeing language meaning 
as a result of language use and the social practices in which language use is 
inscribed. Lorenzer expands this notion by incorporating unconscious dimen-
sions which were not addressed in Wittgenstein’s concept. He sees the lan-
guage games not as mere conventions but as dynamic result of a negotiation 
between language user with different experiences and practices, and hence 
based in these social practices. With Lorenzer’s extension it means that this 
negotiation also involves non- and pre-verbal experiences and also harbors 
elements that are products of a destroyed symbolization of experience. Lan-
guage as an instrument of symbol-building is not simply based on the pre-
symbolic interaction form, but actually contains it. For this reason the pre-
symbolic interaction form remains virulent one’s whole life long, is inseparably 
linked to subsequent, development history-related verbal expression or, being 
excluded from the language symbol spectrum, seeks out other-than-verbal ways 
of finding expression. Today, it is not only clinicians but also social researchers 
who describe this form of active expression as “enactments.” They are the 
unconscious, soulless repetition of interaction experiences that the subject, 
either in times of great need or in response to emotional pain, has tended to 
separate, disassociate or repress. While they cannot, therefore, be integrated 
into the individual processing and development process, they nonetheless shape 
that process.  
If, as described earlier, the early interaction experience cannot be symbol-
ized it still remains an action-driving component of the individual-subjective 
structures and their experience forms. How it differs from symbolized, verbal 
forms is seen in the subject’s inability to reflect on those experience forms. The 
subject is not able to draw upon practice through language. At the same time, 
as Lorenzer repeatedly emphasizes, the non-verbal interaction form is always 
linked to subsequent language symbolic forms. The ability to express oneself 
verbally and pre-verbally involves many other aspects. The language game as a 
concept to identify conflict dynamics in this dual perspective of social and 
individual is presented in one of Lorenzer’s earlier works as follows:  
The term ‘language-game’ is productive in a number of ways: 
1) As a category it refers to human ‘character’ rather than describing human behav-
ior. More precisely, the model of the language-game characterizes individual 
structures as sedimented versions of concrete interactions (as symbolic interac-
tion forms), including the basic elements of both language and action.  
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2) Understanding the constitution of the basic elements of language and action 
renders visible the individual structure as the outcome of a specific production 
process called ‘socialization’. This enables us to see configurations of con-
sciousness, as well as early drafts of future action [Handlungsentwürfe] as a syn-
thesis of nature and societal practice.  
3) When integrated into a theory of individual structures, the model of the language 
game – embracing its constituents practice and language – provides us with a 
useful backdrop that renders visible what was previously opaque, namely the ac-
tive making of configurations of consciousness as they emerge in practices (both 
being realized in concrete interactions) (1977, 34ff.).  
The term language game thus refers to three dimensions of the social: the indi-
vidual structure of the subjective, the socialization process and general social 
practice. In Lorenzer’s work, we learned that individual structure is expression 
of real interaction experiences from early life onwards. Social experiences in 
their ongoing production process constitute behavioral patterns which can be 
generalized. Through conscious verbal action, these also bring a social practice 
to light on which they are also based. Language games can thus only be under-
stood in their social context. They assume a common practice-based agreement 
on meaning and are always the result of social practice Lorenzer 1970b). If the 
language game is the link between a specific interaction form and a language 
figure, then potential disturbances and interferences in the language game can 
be identified. The symbolic unit is dissolved when it is subject to repression.  
When the word is separated from the interaction engram the latter once again 
becomes an unconscious interaction form. The word, for its part, loses its rela-
tion to sensual practice, it becomes emotionless, an empty sign. Thus the in-
teraction engram becomes unconscious again losing all the characteristics 
which it had gained from its relation to the word, i.e. through its introduction 
into the meaning system of language. In other words, what is lost is: the ca-
pacity to reflect upon behavior patterns; and the capacity to “try things out” 
(and thus make meaningful interventions in stimulus-response behavior) and 
to judge actions in a realistic way. ...The de-symbolized language signs suffer 
the opposite fate. They remain in the conscious, where they can be easily ma-
nipulated because they have been freed from their relation to practice figures. 
In this state, they are nothing more than calculation and cold-rational behav-
ior, no longer capable of embodying the specific quality they originally con-
tained and that was originally experienced (Lorenzer 1986, 53; our transla-
tion).  
Lorenzer describes the characterized division between words and interaction 
forms in previously established language games as the destruction of language. 
The destruction of this symbolic unit reverses symbolization, hence the term 
“desymbolization,” and it may occur during (subjective) conflicts later in life. 
This means that once achieved, the ability to symbolize (verbal expression of a 
subjective structure) is withdrawn in relation to a specific problem which the 
individual experiences as an inner conflict. The ability to express an experience 
or an emotional process in words is lost in connection with the issue causing 
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the conflict. Conflict in this sense is seen as the situated clash of irreconcilable, 
contradictory interaction forms.  
Interaction forms which are symbolized in language figures can thus be re-
excluded from the language context. This happens with the aid of resistance 
mechanisms: by repressing them, they are excluded from the conscious rela-
tionship between language and practice. Although this turns them back into 
unconscious interaction forms, the very fact of this reversion allows them to 
retain their energetic, dynamic relevance. They act as behavior drivers, albeit in 
the form of blind action and reaction which is not open to conscious self-
reflection. For the individual, the recurring unconscious reenactment of a scene 
whose structure is similar to the actual conflict, appears in the form of need for 
repetition.  
Symbolization through language has the advantage of being brought to mind 
independently of the real situation and thus fulfills an important function in the 
regulation of emotion. In other words, it assists the subject’s independence 
(tentative action, hesitation). By separating the language from the interaction 
form, the person is again made dependent from the effects of unconscious 
conflict. He or she rarely has the power to free themselves from the dynamics 
of the unconscious scenic processes. This is in worst case the type of problems 
in the clinical psychoanalysis from which Lorenzer starts his theorizing.   
The described division of the symbolic unit in the language game is evident 
in the context of spoken language, in texts and in interviews. It is expressed in 
the structures of a text and is characterized by the fact that it excludes the inter-
action partner, say the interpreter of an interview transcription, from the direct 
understanding. The spoken word is no longer understandable for the listener or 
reader. The societal reference of collective meaning dimensions and a social 
meaning is interrupted.  
So which forms of understanding might provide access to such destroyed, 
de-symbolized language figures? A means of access is needed that reidentifies 
the scenic unit, including when there is no or only an altered form of verbal 
expression because the unit of language symbolic and interaction form has 
been lost. This is where Lorenzer’s idea of scenic understanding has its meth-
odological significance.  
5.  Scenic Understanding 
The basic methodological idea in Lorenzer’s long intellectual journey, and 
particularly when he summarized his ideas in 1986, was the possibility to learn 
from the type of hermeneutic process in psychoanalysis for the analysis of 
cultural phenomena.  
In the psychoanalytic process, all understanding centers on and is related to 
the mode of ‘scenic understanding’. In this mode understanding is attuned to 
HSR 38 (2013) 2  │  46 
two specific objects: the ‘scenic drafts’, i.e. the ‘interaction forms’ of the 
analysand. Particularly hereby psychoanalysis provides us with a model ex-
ample. If we want to understand the analysand’s life-practice, which does not 
exclude his concrete social reality, we must follow the path laid down by his 
subjective phantasies and outlines of relations. This means we must become 
attuned to his scenic interaction forms as these unfold before us (1977, 125).   
What in this quotation is described as a therapeutic approach in the analyst’s 
consultation room can be transferred to understanding texts, language and 
human behavior. Immediately, the question arises as to how a mode of under-
standing can be practiced which explores the scenic in a non-clinical context. 
Lorenzer and his colleagues have demonstrated the approach in relation to 
literary texts and cultural phenomena (Lorenzer 1986; Prokop et al. 2009), and 
we have taken it a bit further into qualitative social research in a number of 
more profane contexts. In the following I shall discuss the methodology of 
scenic understanding and its practical implementation. In other words, how 
could qualitative social research understand unknown subjective content and 
processes which include the unconscious and draw attention to non-verbal 
messages.  
Like every hermeneutic approach it is about understanding the meaning in 
agency and expressions, and in practical social research. Although some 
measures can be taken to make the data suitable scenic understanding can be 
applicable to almost any text or phenomenon referring to agency and subjective 
expression. The prototypical material is, though, a text, or can be seen as a text. 
More exotic ways of producing the data in the first place are videos or conver-
sations held while observing videos (second order field observation). Very 
often the text is a transcript of a focus group discussion or thematic group dis-
cussion. In other cases it may be an interview – individual or collective – or it 
may be a field diary from an observation.  
To identify the meaning structure of a text, we may distinguish different 
levels of interpretation: 
1) The obvious referential content of the text: What is being talked about?  
2) How do people talk to one another? This question on the meta-commun-
icative content of a text takes us to the level of scenic understanding.  
3) Why are the characters talking in precisely this way? How can we under-
stand it by means of theoretical knowledge combined with background fac-
tual knowledge? The first of these steps is the same as in most types of qual-
itative method.  
Step 3 might in its form remind about an explanatory approach which seeks a 
causal or rule-based understanding. Since it is a hermeneutic methodology this 
is not the case, instead it is a more comprehensive multilayered interpretation 
enabled by Step 2. The scenic understanding focuses on the ongoing tense 
relation between the manifest and the unconscious meanings of a text which 
requires an imagination of the unconscious that we can imagine as a collective 
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reservoir of culturally rejected patterns, forbidden yearnings and suppressed 
desires. In-depth hermeneutic interpretation thus focuses on the characters in 
the relationship described in the text and on the dynamics of the relationship 
between a text and its interpreter(s) in order to trace the subjective structure of 
cultural constraints.  
The reference point in the scenic interpretation is the language used in the 
text, with particular attention being placed on how scenes in the text point to 
unexpressed desires and tensions, on how the text arranges “forms of commu-
nication which makes the unspeakable” understandable, or “secures it an un-
negligible position in public space” as Lorenzer says about the task of the poet 
(1986, 24). The initial reading seeks to apply the same type of free-floating 
awareness [gleichschwebende Aufmerksamkeit] as is known from the clinical 
situation: observations of the text and of one’s own reactions are noted without 
coming immediately to any particular conclusions or forming theoretical defi-
nitions. Indications of hidden conflict dynamics include gaps, inconsistencies, 
unusual use of language, jumps in the story or sudden changes of subject, and 
remarkable ways of relating to the subject or to each other (in case of group 
interaction texts). But also the reactions, emotional states and associations of 
the readers/interpreters may be indications of the dynamics we are looking for 
– even if you cannot immediately understand them (compare König 2008, 
Sections 8-10). Practically an interpretation procedure is most often organized 
in a group. Some procedures go line by line, seeking to understand each unit of 
text, and revising the understanding gradually as the later segments are taken 
into consideration. Other procedures start by an open conversation conveying 
“first impressions” and reactions from the members of the interpretation group. 
In some cases you will experience that controversies and conflicts arise within 
an interpretation group, evoked by the text. Using these observations and reac-
tions as a base, particularly powerful passages are subjected to in-depth analy-
sis in interpretation groups (a similarly procedure is described in Marks and 
Mönnich-Marks 2003). What has already been described as the transference 
between the individual reader and the text is now transferred to a collective 
understanding process: the transference and counter-transference dynamics 
multiply. This procedure may lead very directly to “holistic” but preliminary 
interpretations that are set under discussion, or it may produce several “loose 
ends.” The interpretation discussion most likely includes reference to the con-
crete text and its manifest meaning, and it may very well also draw on theoreti-
cal frameworks and on background knowledge which in the first place may 
support or contradict the interpretations suggested. The discussion gradually 
moves into a validation discussion. In principle the validation will refer to 
usual criteria and procedures for validation of qualitative analysis. First of all, it 
will refer to the manifest text on the one hand, and on the other hand to a theo-
retical reflection of the whole complex of subjective agency and expression in 
the text and in the relation between the text and the interpreters.   
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The assumption of unconscious meaning components makes the language 
game an instrument with which to analyze individual structures and to identify 
collective social processes. Language figures and language symbolic interac-
tion forms always possess a social character which goes beyond the individual, 
because they assume social understanding processes within the language com-
munity. As a result, they can be analyzed for the social meaning they contain 
and give an insight into the social configurations and their unconscious, not-
yet-conscious component. This is the methodological bridge which enables the 
unconscious dimensions of experience to be accessed from language. They can 
also be observed from the subjective perspective of the speaker and shed light 
on the individual meaning contained in a specific scene. The language figure 
then reports on the subjective structures and the associated experiences of 
social life practice.  
Reacting on the remarkable behavior of Lou in the illustration example in-
terpreters were led into both an individual psychological reductive interpreta-
tion, and into a cultural criticism against the seductive effects of TV shows like 
Big Brother. We eventually resisted the temptations to leave it there. Led by 
the theoretical points of Alfred Lorenzer we developed a more comprehensive 
psycho-societal interpretation which in no way excludes some regressive as-
pects in the TV audience, and definitely does not exclude a critique of the 
quality and the political dimensions of the TV shows. But we wanted to find 
the collective or societal unconscious mechanism that the show (re)activates in 
Lou as in everybody else, and we wanted to understand why this led her to act 
in this enraged and seemingly irrational way – and in this sense we also wanted 
to rehabilitate Lou as a subject in relation to her violation of good civil behav-
ior, assuming that she was enacting something that was collective and could 
not be explained and reasoned. Referring to Lorenzer’s development of the 
language game concept we would seek to trace the relation between the mani-
fest language meanings in her account, the societal meanings that are relegated 
to unconscious interaction forms pushing on conscious recognition – and the 
wider societal practice in which the language use makes sense.  
A lot of energy in the story told is condensed in Lou’s sentence: “I just 
wanted her out” – Lou’s emotional engagement seems condensed in it, and the 
plot of the scene seems driven by or explained by this sentence.  
On the one hand the words seem harmless. They refer to the rules of games 
which are in broad use and enjoy great social acceptance. Through play, chil-
dren learn that while it is good to win, being a good loser takes far more dignity 
and courage. It is a standard pattern in the type of TV shows to which Big 
Brother belongs, and has spread to be one of the standard storylines of so called 
interactive TV broadcasts.  
On the other hand Lou’s words supported by characteristic behavior gives 
the spoken words an explosiveness which seems – guided by the theory of 
interaction forms and language – to indicate a further meaning than the imme-
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diate referential one: The scene that Lou describes (which is told as having 
taken place in the recent past) seems to have harbored a trigger stimulus which 
forced Lou to act impulsively. Her behavior seemed designed to ensure that 
another person be excluded and punished. On the psychological level violence 
replaces symbolic reflection. This behavior, within a classical psycho-
analytical horizon, recalls the link between oedipal conflict issues from the 
childhood: the daughter wants to push the mother out to more easily gain the 
father’s favor. The intruder is to be destroyed. Lou might have such an individ-
ual version of a standard socialization experience. Although convenient, this 
dramatic constellation from each childhood triangularization phase would be 
reductive and not lend a cultural analytic perspective to the understanding. 
Instead we should look for a potential correspondence between the individual 
subjective dynamic and societal meanings that are implicitly present in the 
social setting of the TV show. We are looking for the supra-individual, societal 
meaning of the story Lou tells, although indirectly. The analysis so far seemed 
to show that the TV show (cultural meaning) elicits unconscious desires and 
identifications (interaction forms) which influence the agency and produces an 
intense ambivalence. The reconstruction of this ambivalence should help reveal 
the unconscious in the text.  
If we recall the interpretations used at the beginning of this paper, the dy-
namic of inclusion and exclusion runs through all interpretations of the text 
sequence. The TV games are about excluding others, exclusion is an important 
part of the game. This is bound up with the setting of norms which sanction the 
exclusion of others. The mass viewer participation seems to indicate not only 
social acceptance but also a widespread need to be included in the game of 
excluding others. Lou serves as an exemplary viewer and contestant – she 
stands for more than just herself, in that her reaction is representative of the 
desired inclusion of viewers in the game. It seems justified to see Lou’s actions 
and the key statement as part of a language game in Lorenzer’s sense – com-
bining the explicit and manifest meaning with experiences of winning inclusion 
by joining the exclusion of others, and a societal perspective in a neo-liberal 
society where separation prevails over integration. But we may also interpret 
her reactions so that the participation in this language game elicits ambivalent 
feelings. We can relate it to the moral paradox that the exclusive action is justi-
fied by the defense for the moral integrity in the community in the TV show 
container.  
With the positive evaluation of what is generally seen as negative behavior 
(exclusion), a door is opened to judgmental and stereotypical attitudes in eve-
ryday life which allow the unknown and the foreign to be negated without 
punishment and eventually to be eliminated. The definition of foreign, un-
known elements as a justification for exclusion is reminiscent of the well-
known studies on the social function of prejudices (Adorno, Aron, Levinson 
and Morrow 1951), in which projective power serves in shifting everything one 
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dislikes in oneself onto another group and then combating it in that group. The 
dynamic of exclusion can take the form of collective violence if it is not har-
nessed and is allowed to develop uncontrolled.  
Thus, the sentence “I just wanted her out” becomes a battle cry in a fight 
against the undesirable and alien. The vehemence with which it is spouted 
reveals its individual emotional foundation – the exclusion of the undesirable 
serves the defense of the individuals own boundaries, the collective self is 
stabilized through projective stigmatization of the other and the subsequent 
exclusion of a person deemed foreign and strange. The mass reception of such 
TV-shows seems to point to the societal strength of a language game – a com-
bination between language use, outlines of life practice and a world view in 
which the identification with one’s own group is based in excluding others who 
are deemed “strangers.” A collectively fascinating TV game which not only 
uses this projection mechanism but nurtures it under greenhouse-like condi-
tions helps foster general acceptance of archaic, collective defensive for-
mations. The consciousness and norms which are communicated no longer 
need be subjected to conscious, reflective reality checks. Through mass fasci-
nation and the social practice it is based upon, it appears adequately legitimat-
ed.  
When we finally returned to the relation of the interpretation group: Do we 
also have a share in the exclusion game? The individual ”clinical” interpreta-
tion of the case can be recognized as a defense against the collective regression 
whose analysis triggered outrage among the interpreters themselves. Whereas 
the interpretation of an immature, oedipal conflict constellation or an unguided 
individual loss of control based on a simple identification appears quite harm-
less. Recognizing the collective nature of the unspoken interaction forms, and 
the ambivalence in Lou’s actions also makes visible that she is actually also – 
utopian? – longing for community and integration.  
In our fellow interpreters’ account (Bereswill, Morgenroth and Redman 
2010) you can see this interpretation presented with a main emphasis on the 
process in the interpretation community and the interplay between the scenes in 
the TV-show, the scene in which Lou acts, and the scene of interpreting. This is 
illustrating the methodological point that the transfer/counter-transfer between 
interpreters and text take advantage of the scenic imagination. Here we empha-
size the aspect of theoretical guidance because the theoretical framework and 
the psycho-societal methodological ambition – including Lorenzer’s notion of 
the collective unconscious and the scenic – really were imperatives which 
helped the interpreter group to look for the traces of the extended language 
game in the text which did not appear easily. And this seems to be an essential 
lesson for doing psycho-societal research.  
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6.  An Epistemological Perspective: Psychoanalysis, 
Language and Knowing 
Alfred Lorenzer’s contribution enriches the interpretational social science with 
a new theory and some quite practical inspiration for dealing empirically with 
the subjective aspects of social agency and interaction. This is in itself highly 
appreciated. Many qualitative methods tend to take their informants/ narrators/ 
sources for granted, and to neglect the involvement of the researcher subject as 
well (Breuer, Mruck and Roth 2002). The awareness of an epistemic subject-
object-relativity is growing, and research activity is also increasingly recog-
nized as a social practice in itself (Roth and Breuer 2003), but the contributions 
providing tools provided for reflecting researcher subjectivity seem insuffi-
cient. Lorenzer, among others, problematizes the subject category – both the 
subjects in the text and the subjects who are researching – redefining the need 
for reflection into an empirical issue. He takes over the Wittgensteinian notions 
of language use and language games, and anchors them in the socialization and 
the mediation of societal culture which for the individual may take conscious as 
well as unconscious forms. Applying this extended notion of language use and 
language game he opens a new window to the epistemic process – the condi-
tion of knowing is founded in the materiality of the cultural reproduction, in-
cluding the researcher subject experiencing in the medium of (a) language 
(game) and developing it. It seems also that in this way relativist excesses of 
some contemporary constructivism can be avoided by redefining the relativity 
issue into an empirical one.  
Lorenzer goes one step deeper in theorizing the societal framework of un-
derstanding the subjects – or rather the subjectivities. In this way it also seems 
as if he avoids the risk that made Berger and Luckmann (1966) warn so strong-
ly against the alliance with psycho-analysis, the risk of reducing subjectivity to 
a mechanical “natural” causality. It seems that his consequent material and 
endogenous notion of the unconscious enables a clearly hermeneutic stance 
without giving up the bodily dimensions of the human subjectivity.  
Berger and Luckmann’s comments are particularly interesting because their 
book has been assigned the honor to be the first main work of constructivism. 
Both Lorenzer and Berger and Luckmann anticipate the poststructuralist cri-
tique of Marxism. And we think that Lorenzer – exactly by building on the 
psychoanalysis that Berger and Luckmann warned against – produced an alter-
native answer to their ambition of unified social theory theorizing the agency-
based (re)production of societal structures.  
It is contested if Berger and Luckmann’s book actually belongs to the tradi-
tion of social constructivism (Collin 2002), but at least it has been possible to 
interpret it into that framework. It seems more appropriate to see their book as 
a precursor, which made visible the wider consequences for social theory of 
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theorizing knowledge as a societal phenomenon. North American constructiv-
ism has developed this into an epistemology in which the role of cul-
ture/knowledge/discourse surmounts the role the subject as well as the societal 
object.  
Lorenzer’s work indicates a different possible continuation of Berger and 
Luckmann’s story. We may see a psycho-social theory of the subject and the 
role of language in subjectivity as a foundation for a parallel materialistic con-
structivism, with the social philosophy of the Frankfurt School in several gen-
erations as a backbone (Adorno 1976 [1969]). It may partly be seen as a differ-
ence between an American tradition in which G. H. Mead is a both 
representative and distinguished figure, and a psycho-societal conception main-
ly based in Europe. A contemporary discussion of the relation between Mead’s 
and Lorenzer’s social psychology would be really interesting. The adoption or 
refusal of a psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious dimensions of the 
social seems to be distinctive. Adorno’s theoretical integration of psychoanalyt-
ical theory into sociology was connected with the need to understand the psy-
chic mechanisms which enabled the political success of Nazism. Adorno in his 
own empirical research into the social psychology of authoritarianism provided 
a timely case for this interrelation (Adorno et al. 1951). In order to understand 
in which way the particular is mediated through, but not determined by, the 
societal whole you need to understand and examine empirically also the dy-
namics of the individual psyche – as a mediation of societal relations. Psychoa-
nalysis was offering a theoretically developed and empirically specified re-
search into the psyche, and the interrelations between body and (certain aspects 
of) consciousness – but it needed a reconceptualization in sociological context 
– reinterpreting psychic dynamics as mediations of societal relations – and that 
is to say a social psychology of culture – with implications also for (scientific) 
knowledge.  
Lorenzer’s particular contribution is to present a theory of the materiality of 
the consciousness which enables an immanent or endogenous understanding of 
societal change, and a methodology for researching it empirically. The devel-
opment of interpretive methods building on psychoanalysis and hermeneutic 
text interpretation enable an empirical study of how the dynamics of knowing 
on the social level could be connected with the dynamics of inner psychic 
experience.  
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